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SEX IS ABOUT POWER:  
Dissecting Pornography’s Role in the Sexual Language Game 
 
Hitaxhe Kupa 
The University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I offer a pragmatic and philosophical critique of Rae Langton and 
Caroline West’s Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game. I begin the paper by 
developing Langton and West’s argument that pornography is a speech act that can be 
understood as partly continuous with other speech, yet different to the ways of political 
argument. Pornography, they argue, subordinates and silences women. I offer a 
pragmatic critique in identifying the divergence of the pornographic language game and 
the [general] sexual language game. Then, I offer a philosophical critique that 
undermines pornography’s status as an exercitive speech act. Langton and West, while 
sufficiently ascribing pornography to continuous speech, failed to contest MacKinnon’s 
selective definition of pornography and failed to appeal to the power-based analysis of 
gender that attributes authority to pornographers. 
 
I DEVELOPMENT OF PORNOGRAPHY AS A SPEECH ACT 
Langton and West begin in presenting two strongly contrasting views of 
pornography and its status as a speech act, both of which bear heavily on an important 
political question: is a ban on pornography (or at least violent pornography) justifiable? 
The first view is that of Ronald Dworkin: the rational argument. According to Dworkin, 
pornography is political speech that aims to persuade its listeners of the truth of certain 
ideas about women. When pornography delivers the “message” that women are 
submissive, or enjoy being dominated, it is likened to speech advocating that women 
occupy inferior roles. This form of speech, as defined by Dworkin, is protected under 
the First Amendment. The second view is that of Catharine MacKinnon: the reductive 
argument. According to MacKinnon, pornographic speech is the result of psychological 
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conditioning that associates violence and misogynistic views with sexual stimuli. In this 
view, pornography is not political speech, but a non-rational stimulus; thus, a ban on 
violent pornography can be supported. Langton and West claim both views are 
extremes and not wholly plausible; they propose a moderate thought that qualifies 
pornography as speech that produces effects on beliefs, desires, and behavior. 
Langton and West are exploring two important feminist claims: pornography 
subordinates and silences women. They proceed on the assumption that pornography is 
speech. Referencing MacKinnon, they argue that pornography as speech has a certain 
content and acts in a certain way. Said by an authoritative speaker, the speech has an 
illocutionary doing that legitimizes attitudes and behaviors. In the case of pornography, 
pornography signifies women are inferior and sexual violence is normal and legitimate.  
The purpose of this paper is to broadly support MacKinnon’s claims: 
pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. First, there is the question of 
what pornography says: Does pornography really say that women are inferior, or that 
sexual violence is normal and legitimate? Langton and West find two reasons of doubt: 
(1) pornography does not say these things explicitly and (2) pornography purports to 
be fiction. Langton and West dispel the first doubt in referencing David Lewis’s 
Scorekeeping in a Language Game: there is a distinction between explicit speech and 
presupposed, implied, and suggested speech. Lewis discusses the rule-governed 
language game. In a speech situation, “saying” is more than an utterance of strings of 
words, it is to make a move in the language game. The components of the score are set-
theoretic constructs, such as sets of presuppositions. The score of the game is based 
off the acceptability value of the sentences. It is important to note that scorekeeping 
evolves over time, what is taboo in one generation, is acceptable in another.  
Langton and West narrow in on the Rule of Accommodation: speech requires 
components of conversational score to be a certain way. Illocutionary moves are 
permissions and prohibitions that may be explicit or implicit. To illustrate the rule, they 
refer to a master’s prohibition that a slave crosses a white line. The master could 
explicitly prohibit the slave, or say something that presupposed the slave was not allowed 
to cross the white line. The master could say, “I hereby prohibit you to cross this white 
line.” which is an explicit move of prohibition to cross the line. The master could also 
say, “The punishment for leaving the grounds is death.” which is an implicit move of 
prohibition to cross the line.  Pornography’s claims that women are inferior or that 
sexual violence is normal can be presupposed, rather than explicitly stated. For example, 
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a favorable gang rape depiction presupposes “gang rape is enjoyable for men.” They 
conclude pornography can say such things even if it does not explicitly say them. 
Second, there is the question of whether pornography speaks with authority. The 
conclusion about pornography’s power to subordinate and silence women requires the 
premise about pornography’s authority. To answer the question of subordination, 
Langton and West once more refer to the slave and the master. The master’s ability to 
subordinate the slave, using words, depends on his authority. The master’s words have 
power because he is the master. Pornography, they argue, has the authority to legitimize 
sexual violence and thus subordinate women. To answer the question of silence, the rules 
of accommodation prevent certain intended moves in a language game. Women are 
comparatively powerless in sexual language games; women cannot, or do not, challenge 
pornography’s score in the language game. 
Finally, pornography purports to be fiction. According to Langton and West, 
fictional stories are played out on a background of fact. Pornographers are liars, or 
background liars that make fictional propositions [about what women enjoy], or 
background blurrers – they fail to indicate the line between fiction and background. 
Langton and West conclude that pornography changes the conversational score in life, 
making it continuous enough with other speech. 
 
II CONFLATION OF PORNOGRAPHIC LANGUAGE WITH SEXUAL 
LANGUAGE 
In this section I want to raise the question: How much of a role does 
pornography have to play in the sexual language game? To begin, I want to highlight 
Catharine MacKinnon’s definition of pornography: ‘the graphic sexually explicit 
subordination of women in pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized 
as sexual objects, things or commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being 
tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual submission 
or servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or 
presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; 
bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context which makes these conditions sexual.’ According 
to MacKinnon, pornography does not just cause harm to women, pornography is harm 
to women.  
As by MacKinnon’s definition, pornography is the graphic sexually explicit 
subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words. The mark of the 
pornographic for MacKinnon is that it celebrates, eroticizes or legitimates the sexual 
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subordination of women. On this view, pornography does not just depict the sexual 
subordination of women: it endorses the sexual subordination of women and by 
legitimating women’s subordination, pornography subordinates. MacKinnon wants to 
argue that pornography conditions its consumers to be sexually aroused by the 
degradation, humiliation, brutalization, and objectification of women.  
This definition obviously excludes material that would otherwise count as 
pornographic, such as gay pornography. I want to argue that MacKinnon’s definition 
(as it is also appropriated by Langton and West) is disparate with social and legal 
definitions of pornography. As such, it hinders the effective advocacy of equalizing the 
sexual language game. Socially, pornography refers to material dealing with sex designed 
to arouse its readers or viewers. Legally, there are two types of pornography that receive 
no First Amendment protection — obscenity and child pornography. The social and 
legal definitions operate in tandem.  
The legality of pornography has been traditionally determined by implementing 
the Miller Test. The test dictates that the opinion of the local community on a 
pornographic piece is most important in determining its legality. The basic guideline for 
obscenity is as follows: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the 
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 
Legality is of concern in assessing MacKinnon, and later Langton and West, as they 
over-archingly call for the censorship of pornography that subordinates women.  
There is an important component to the social definition of pornography: “sexually 
explicit.” There are multiple mediums that subordinate and silence women that are outside 
the social and legal definition of pornography. I briefly cover four such mediums. 
 
1. Advertisement 
In November, 2015, Bloomingdales, the upscale department store, published a 
new holiday catalog. A woman is laughing, head tossed back, focused on something 
over her right shoulder. A man stares at her, unsmiling. The caption reads: Spike your 
best friend’s eggnog when they’re not looking. The ad sends the message that it is ok to have 
sex with people who are incapable of consent. In April, 2015, Bud Light published a 
new label: “The perfect beer for removing ‘no’ from your vocabulary for the night.” 
Both Bloomingdales and Bud Light faced accusations of promoting rape.  
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2. Music  
In Robin Thicke’s hit single “Blurred Lines,” he sings “I know you want it” 
eighteen times. In the song “U.O.E.N.O,” Rick Ross raps, “Put Molly all in her 
champagne, she ain’t even know it; I took her home and I enjoyed that, she ain’t even 
know it;” Both popular songs have pro-date rape messages, removing the sense of 
agency in women. 
 
3. Video Games 
The video game “RapeLay” is a rape stimulator. The agent in the game 
methodically rapes his way through a family of three women. The game features a series 
of screens informing the player of how they can stalk the women. The virtual women 
scream and cry; the player is able to force them into a variety of positions. The game 
features disturbing graphics like blood upon raping the young virgin girls, and the ability 
to invite your friends to assist in a gang rape. 
 
4. Novels 
As of June, 2015, Fifty Shades of Grey, the best-selling book, had sold over 125 
million copies world-wide. The book features sexual practices involving bondage, 
dominance/submission, and sadism/masochism (BDSM). The problem is that Fifty 
Shades casually associates hot sex with violence, but without any of the consent. 
Sometimes, Ana, the main character, says yes to sex she’s uncomfortable with because 
she’s too shy to speak her mind, or because she’s afraid of losing Christian, her business 
magnate boyfriend; she gives consent when he wants to inflict pain, yet that doesn’t 
prevent her from being harmed. 
There is strong cultural evidence of the language game that provides men with 
rules of accommodation and silences women. However, the conflation of the 
pornographic language game with the inherently unequal sexual language game produces 
untenable differences in the social and legal definition of pornography and 
MacKinnon’s definition of pornography. While the hard-core pornography that mutilates 
women may be considered obscene and thus censored, what of the soft-core pornography 
or implicit messages on the subconscious that perpetuate the subordination of women 
and normalization of sexual violence across multiple mediums? MacKinnon’s definition 
is deliberate. She wants to ban pornography on the grounds it reduces women to 
second-class citizens. Pornography, as the speech act that Langton and West argue, is 
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an act of gender discrimination and hence illegal. They write, “Whatever the reason, 
pornography affects the pre-suppositional score in the sexual language game.” The 
pornographic language game is not equivalent to the sexual language game, it is merely 
one component. There exists media that adheres to MacKinnon’s definition of 
pornography, but not the social and legal definitions of pornography. As a result, we 
have a philosophical stalemate concerning the status of speech and its potential 
subjection to censorship.  
 
III PORNOGRAPHY IS NOT A STANDARD EXERCITIVE 
 To briefly critique pornography’s status as speech that subordinates and 
silences women, I will refer to a paper by Mary McGowan, On Pragmatics, Exercitive Speech 
Acts and Pornography. First, standard exercitives express the content of the permissibility 
of facts enacted. For example, if a parent tells a child, “no television until your 
homework is complete,” they express the content of the permissibility. Langton and 
West do not sufficiently describe how pornography enacts permissibility facts without 
expressing the content of those facts. Second, excercitives express both the 
illocutionary and the locutionary speaker intentions. The producers, distributors, and 
purveyors of pornography do not intend to be enacting permissibility conditions of any 
kind. Langton and West would agree: “pornography is designed to generate, not 
conclusions, but orgasms.” Such illocutionary intention would generate political speech, 
as Dworkin suggests. The speaker’s intention is an important part of how exercitive 
speech acts work. Even if the speech acts do not constitute a necessary condition of 
exercitive force, the conditions are important evidence that a particular speech act has 
such force – or that pornography has the authority to subordinate and silence women.  
 Third, the hearers, or those exposed to pornography, cannot recognize 
intentions that are non-existent. Recognition of intentions is an important epistemic 
criterion of standard exercitive force. Forth, the authority to enact permissibility of 
pornographers is questionable. Langton and West did not appeal to structural or power-
based analysis of gender, nor the power of media, nor the power of mass-distribution 
of large corporations. Langton and West failed to establish and provide evidence for 
the authority of pornographers. They do not want to concede that pornography acts on 
a level of unconsciousness through the form of psychological conditioning; 
pornography would not be a speech act if that were the case. However, Langton and 
West failed to account for pornography’s function at the conscious level of 
communicated intentions. This objection undermines the speech act approach to 
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pornography. Referring to the ideas in Section II, Langton and West’s conception of 
pornography fails to enact permissibility facts by triggering the rules operative in a 
system of gender oppression. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I developed Langton and West’s theory of pornography as a speech 
act. I offered a pragmatic rejection against the conflation of the pornographic language 
game and sexual language game that is inherently gender-unequal. I offered a 
philosophical rejection that undermines pornography’s status as an exercitive speech 
act. Oscar Wilde is known to have said, “Everything in the world is about sex, except 
sex. Sex is about power.” If we account for the power-based analysis of gender, we can 
understand a more robust intersection of speech and feminism. 
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“POINT-AND-PROCLAIM”:  
A Possible Response to the Grounding Problem 
 
Eli Barrish 
The University of Texas at Austin 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The two-thinger holds that distinct objects can be spatiotemporally coincident, 
but when two things are colocated, one must wonder how they can share some 
properties without sharing all. If objects match in primitive properties, what grounds 
their so-called “higher order” differences? I consider why someone might want to be a 
two-thinger, despite this problem. I then evaluate the primitivist solution proposed by 
Karen Bennett, and explore an alternative that she rejects: the “point-and-proclaim” 
model. Bennett’s primary objection to point-and-proclaim is that it requires a namer to 
name one among a “bazillion” indistinguishable objects. In response, I develop a new 
model for the naming of indistinguishables. Rather than pointing to an object, the 
namer merely tags the first unnamed object that rises to the surface of an infinite well 
of indistinguishable objects. “Point-and-proclaim” is shown to be a misnomer, one that 
might draw undue disparagement for a potentially appealing response to the grounding 
problem. 
 
I THE GROUNDING PROBLEM 
The two-thinger holds that distinct objects can be spatiotemporally coincident. 
When a lump of clay, Lumpl, is shaped into a statue, Goliath, the two things will seem 
to share all properties, including spacetime location. But what is in a name? Though 
Goliath and Lumpl match primitively and look exactly the same, significant differences 
emerge. Lumpl, as a lump of clay, survives being kicked across the room, whereas 
Goliath, the statue, is destroyed. Goliath, however, will do better than Lumpl at an art 
auction. In virtue of what do Lumpl and Goliath diverge in these “higher order” 
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properties? This paper considers why someone might want to be a two-thinger, despite 
this grounding problem. It then evaluates the primitivist solution provided by Karen 
Bennett, and explores an alternative she quickly rejects: the “point-and-proclaim” 
model. To help with this task, I develop a new model for the naming of 
indistinguishable objects. 
 The two-thinger’s position is best justified by explanation of the difficulties 
facing the one-thinger. According to Leibniz’s law, objects with different properties are 
distinct. So if a region of spacetime contains coincident objects exhibiting different 
properties, then plural distinct objects live there, vindicating the two-thinger. To remain 
a one-thinger, one must either deny Leibniz’s law (some do so readily--but I will not 
enter that fray), deny that Lumpl and Goliath differ in properties, or deny that they are 
colocated. Lumpl and Goliath occupy the exact same spatiotemporal location; Lumpl, 
after all, is the stuff of which Goliath is made. Lumpl and Goliath certainly seem to 
exhibit different properties. At least two groups of properties seem to differ between 
Lumpl and Goliath: 
 
1. Goliath could survive a chipped nose, while Lumpl could not. The two objects 
have different persistence conditions. 
 
2. Goliath is a statue, while Lumpl is not. Lumpl is a piece of clay, while Goliath is 
not. These categorical differences register as different sortal properties.  
 
Taken together, these sortalish properties (Bennett’s language) create problems for 
the one-thinger. Despite being colocated and similar in many primitive ways, if one 
keeps faith with Leibniz, Lumpl and Goliath are distinct. There are certainly paths 
forward for the one-thinger (including denial of Leibniz’s law), but the strongest 
defense is a fierce offense. The two-thinger also faces a tremendous problem, says that 
one-thinger, a problem that makes Lumpl and Goliath more trouble than they are 
worth. Bennett puts the grounding problem like this: 
 
“[I]n light of the fact that spatio-temporally coincident things have all of 
their other properties in common, in virtue of what do they have the 
sortalish properties they do?”. 
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In other words, if Lumpl and Goliath look the same, occupy the same slice in 
spacetime, smell the same, feel texturally the same, etc., then why do they live and die 
by different principles—why do they sell for different prices—why are they, simply, 
different kinds of things? Bennet proposes three ways for the two-thinger to respond to 
the grounding problem: first by maintaining that things have sortalish properties in 
virtue of their non-sortalish ones; second by delegating responsibility for properties 
onto our concepts and attitudes; third by claiming that sortalish properties, are, in fact, 
primitive, thus evading the brunt of the grounding problem . The first response 
(supervenience of non-sortals) I leave to Bennett to handle; the second (conceptualism) 
I explore with the point-and-proclaim model; and the third (primitivism) I will now 
critically evaluate. 
 
II PRIMITIVISM 
Primitivism holds that all the sortalish properties held essentially by an object are 
also held primitively. For instance, one might suppose that Goliath has the properties 
“essentially a statue,” “essentially man-shaped,” and “essentially made of clay.” For the 
primitivist, these essential, sortalish properties are primitive. They are had by Goliath in 
virtue of nothing else. By claiming such sortalish properties as primitive, Bennett avoids 
the difficulty of explaining what grounds them. However, Bennett must still respond to 
a problem of distribution. Goliath essentially has the sortalish property of “survives a 
chipped nose,” but lacks the property “survives being smashed against the ground.” 
Why? Not how, but why? This question does not rehash the grounding problem; it asks 
for explanation of why certain primitive sortals go with various objects. 
Bennett employs a theory of plenitude. She says that the multi-thinger, when 
faced with the grounding problem, should claim that for any spacetime region 
containing an object, all possible sortal properties are instantiated. There exists, near 
Goliath, a thing that isn’t exactly Goliath, but instead a Goliath-like thing that survives 
being smashed. It isn’t Goliath because has this extra property. We use naming to group 
out certain sortals. The thing we term “Goliath” has essentially the primitive property 
of failing to survive smashing, but nothing grounds this property. 
According to Bennett, this position ought to be palatable to the multi-thinger 
because: (A) the multi-thinger already defends two colocated objects; why not a 
bazillion? and (B) there exists no appealing alternative. But bazillion-thingerdom has 
hidden costs. For one, it requires extreme ontological commitment. Now every region 
of spacetime, insofar as it is occupied by anything, is occupied by everything. Goliath 
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and Lumpl are joined by all the infinite near-Goliath and near-Lumpl neighbors, 
expressing properties like “survives being sawed in half,” “would not make the cut at 
Sotheby’s,” “looks better from a certain angle,” and so on. There is no end to the 
sortalish properties one could think up for this region of spacetime. This ontological 
commitment probably doesn’t trouble the two-thinger overmuch, but it is still worth 
considering. 
 Among a bazillion things, one can still describe Goliath and list some of its sortal 
properties. But one wonders what Bennett’s bazillion-thinger model adds. It adds 
vagueness--who knows what object among this muddle of similar objects the name 
“Goliath” should pick out? And although bazillion-thingerdom doesn’t imply that the 
namer instantiates Goliath’s properties through the power of speech, it bears 
resemblance. The namer must pick Goliath’s properties out of an infinite list. The 
advantage of the plenitude theoryis that it deems properties as already being present, 
whereas under the point-and-proclaim theory properties owe their existence to the 
namer’s instantiation. 
 Primitivism also produces weak generalizable principles for grounding sortalish 
properties. Let us switch from Goliath to the statue that represents the Western ideal 
of male beauty: Michelangelo’s David. For Bennett, the property of David being 
“essentially handsome” has no grounding principle; it is primitive. The property of 
David being handsome could very well be grounded in David’s facial symmetry, his 
lithe and youthful form, or his attire. But isn’t it easier to say David is handsome in 
virtue of being essentially handsome? Bazillion-thingerdom opens this unfortunate 
door to grounding non-essential sortals in essential sortals every time. Say that one also 
finds Goliath to be a handsome statue. One would like to find points of comparison 
between Goliath and David; both are strapping young men with bulging muscles. But 
primitivism would ground David’s handsomeness in his essential handsomeness, not in 
traits he might share with Goliath. One could ground Goliath’s handsomeness in his 
physique, but just as easily one could claim that Goliath has essentially the property of 
being handsome, and that this property grounds his more mundane features (including 
muscles). This illustrates an almost Euthyphroean dilemma for the bazillion-thinger: is 
Goliath handsome because of his shape and attributes, or is he shaped that way because 
he is essentially handsome?  
 Given plenitude, there is no clear answer to this question. This deficit, which 
others have also noticed, makes primitivism uniquely unappealing. What use are sortal 
properties if they have nothing in common over their instantiation in several distinct 
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objects? In a sense, they no longer sort. Goliath is handsome. David is handsome. But 
both might be handsome primitively, or in virtue of entirely different primitives. 
Handsomeness, grounded in nothing else, gets particularized to each statue. Nothing 
necessarily ties David and Goliath together. No shared non-sortals ground their good 
looks. So they are not really of the same kind. As a consequence, we lose any explanatory 
power for how we, as humans, categorize objects. 
 I do not pretend that these arguments are conclusive, but I hope they disturb the 
primitivist bazillion-thinger enough to encourage them to continue looking for other 
responses to the grounding problem. Now, I will explore a response Bennett dismisses 
as “just unacceptable”: point-and-proclaim. 
 
III “POINT-AND-PROCLAIM” AND THE NAMING OF 
INDISTINGUISHABLES 
Point-and-proclaim falls under the umbrella of conceptualism, which holds that an 
object’s sortal properties are grounded by “human attitudes, concepts, and 
conventions.” Some properties clearly come about this way. The property of “being 
handsome” (whether applied to statue or human) is one of them. Insofar as 
handsomeness is grounded, what, other than human preference, could ground it? 
Bennett supplies the example of “being hip,” a property whose grounds are cultural. 
The shag carpet once covered every hip apartment’s floor; now hardwood and concrete 
are more appealing. 
 To pose conceptualism as an answer to the grounding problem, one must make 
similar claims for all sortalish properties. But I don’t think this requirement is 
outlandish. The very word “sortal” implies sorting, an action done more by humans 
than by the universe. The property “Goliath survives a chipped nose” can be conceived 
of as conceptual in this way: we name Goliath with a description in mind, selecting the 
clay-matter that makes up the statue in a way that aligns with preconceived concepts. 
An art historian, imagining Goliath as a statue of a man, may think, A man survives losing 
a nose; therefore, man-shaped statues survive the same treatment; and for the Goliath he points 
to, this is so. Meanwhile, the sculptor of Goliath may look at his chipped creation and 
think, My statue is destroyed! The art historian and the sculptor refer to different objects 
in naming Goliath, choosing different persistence conditions to apply to different 
objects sharing one name. Neither the art historian nor the sculptor is wrong in their 
naming or in their statements about persistence. 
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 To an outside observer, the art historian and the scuptor appear to be pointing 
at the same spacetime region and speaking about distinct objects. According to the 
point-and-proclaim model, that is, in fact, what they are doing. The pointer-and-
proclaimer gestures to Goliath and says that it survives a chipped nose. Another person 
points to Lumpl (or another Goliath), an indistinguishable object occupying the same 
spatiotemporal location, and says that it doesn’t survive a chipped nose. Before the 
proclamation, we have two indistinct objects (all properties in common); after the 
proclamation, the objects have different properties. This is the sticking point for 
Bennett: the coaxing of different properties out of indistinguishable objects. 
 Bennett’s particular issue is that point-and-proclaim requires us to point to a 
particular object, even when there is nothing distinguishing that object from its 
colocated neighbors. When we proclaim Goliath to be handsome, we need to first find 
Goliath among all the indistinguishable Goliath-like statues occupying the same 
spacetime. In response, I would like to develop a new model for the naming of 
indistinguishables that relies on this simple principle: because the colocated Goliaths 
are indistinguishable, sharing all properties but the haecceity, there is no wrong choice. 
Spacetime locations, on this model, are like wells filled with infinite, indistinguishable 
fish. Grab one out, and still--an infinite number of fish remain swimming in the well. 
One doesn’t need a guiding rule or principle to pick out the first fish; just stick your 
hand in and a fish will latch on. Name one Goliath among the multitudinous Goliaths, 
assign it the designation “G1,” and worry not about why that particular fish came to 
you; they are all the same. You can then proclaim G1, the named Goliath, as surviving 
a chipped nose. The next Goliath to swim to the top gets the property of not surviving. 
This model avoids Bennett’s concern about picking out a particular object among 
indistinguishable objects. 
Bennett could renew her concern in this way. After proclaiming G1, one also 
wants to name a Goliath that doesn’t survive a chipped nose. Call it G2. One might 
worry about picking a “fish” that has already been accounted for. The namer has 
proclaimed G1 and wants to proclaim a distinct G2. If the fish are all indistinguishable, 
what’s to stop them from mistakenly assigning two names and two sets of properties to 
the same one? But recall that G1 has already been proclaimed. It has new properties: 
those of having the name G1, and of surviving a chipped nose. It isn’t one of the 
multitudinous indistinguishables anymore. The fish is out of the well, and the 
proclaimer can safely name G2 as one of the infinite colocated Goliaths left unnamed 
in the space-time location. 
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 Insofar as this principle of naming leads to semantic confusion, vagueness, and 
indecision, it is no more at fault than Bennett’s plenitude model. Both models speak to 
possibly bazillions of colocated objects. But point-and-proclaim has two added benefits. 
First, it preserves a grounding principle that is generalizable. The point-and-proclaimer 
speaks from an experience that is somewhat individual, but also somewhat shared: the 
sculptor and art historian work in related disciplines and hold in common certain 
cultural values. Second, it avoids vagueness better. Although initially the vagueness is 
absolute—all the many fish are the same—it is dispelled in the proclaiming step of 
point-and-proclaim. G1 survives a chipped nose, whereas G2, the next fish in the well, 
can be proclaimed to not survive a chipped nose. Outside observers may not notice the 
distinction between the two Goliaths at first glance, but the art historian and the 
sculptor can explain their views on the matter (“my Goliath” … “but my Goliath…”). 
A vision of colocated objects with different, distinguishing, pointed-and-proclaimed 
properties emerges. And this, of course, is how sorting (mostly) works in the real world: 
we argue and debate about what sort of things objects are and how they ought to be 
grouped. 
 A certain degree of vagueness is inevitable for the two-thinger. It is hard to point 
to one of two colocated objects. But the point-and-proclaim model gives us a workable 
mechanism for how this can occur, where sortalish properties come from, and methods 
for avoiding semantic uncertainty. This model may require a more thorough 
explanation, but I believe that it deserves such a defense as well, rather than a cursory 
dismissal. 
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       Aristotle wants us to feel the proper emotions: “having these feelings at the right 
times…is proper to virtue” (NE 2.6.1106b). By claiming that feeling the right emotions 
is proper to virtue, Aristotle is ultimately suggesting that we are responsible to feel 
emotions that are central to a life lived well. This moral responsibility implies that we 
can choose to experience these emotions, but Aristotle thinks we can’t control which 
emotions we feel, asserting that often “we are angry and afraid without decision” (NE 
2.5.1106a). How is it possible to choose the appropriate emotions when we can’t 
control our emotions?1     
  To resolve this tension, we need to see if Aristotle’s conception of what emotions 
are can explain how these claims actually don’t contradict each other. Aristotle, as many 
perplexed commentators note2, doesn’t provide us with a precise and systematic 
account of emotions anywhere in his ethical works, leaving open the question of what 
exactly his conception is. Martha Nussbaum argues that emotions for Aristotle are 
judgments that attach value to the things at which they are directed3. In this paper, I 
defend Nussbaum’s reading by arguing that her account helps explain why Aristotle 
demands we choose the proper emotions while maintaining that we can’t control our 
emotions.  
       First, I contend that the right emotions for Aristotle are value judgments that are 
elements of a life lived well. Specifically, I claim that emotions determine that the things 
at which they are directed are meaningful to us in some way and that it is integral to 
“living well” than an agent ascribes meaning through the proper emotions. We can 
                                                 
1 L.A. Kosman points this out in Being Properly Affected (106).  
2  See John Cooper’s An Aristotelian Theory of Emotion and Stephen Leighton’s Aristotle and the 
Emotions.  
3 See Martha Nussbaum’s Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion (303-04).  
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choose the correct emotions, then, by revising and turning the meanings our emotions 
ascribe into meanings that constitute other emotions and a life being lived well. With 
this argument in place, I suggest our emotions may strike us as outside of our control 
but that Aristotle thinks we are capable of reformulating these emotions.  
 
 
                                                              I 
 
     Emotions have a central role in Aristotelian ethics. Delineating the moral relevancy 
of feeling emotions, Aristotle writes, “if he [he who] stands firm against terrifying 
situations and enjoys it…he is brave; if he finds it painful, he is cowardly"(NE 
3.1104a.5). According to this claim, a person can carry out brave actions like fighting in 
a battle, but if he isn’t also feeling specific emotions—perhaps joy at facing the enemy—
then he isn’t really brave. Thus certain actions (such as brave actions) need to be 
accompanied by specific emotions because they are incomplete (not really brave) 
without the emotions. The significance of this claim is that feeling emotions, for 
Aristotle, is just as important as doing actions: “virtues are concerned with actions and 
emotions” (NE 2.3.1104b.14). 
     The sense in which emotions are important goes beyond emotions accompanying 
actions. In other words, Aristotle doesn’t think that emotions are simply handmaidens 
to our actions; he thinks that it is essential to feel certain emotions in their own right, 
regardless of if they accompany or are followed by action. Returning to bravery: imagine 
being diagnosed with a terminal illness. In this terrifying situation, you are expected to 
be brave, for “the brave person will find death and wounds painful…but he will endure 
them” (NE 3.9.117b.10-15). Yet even if actions may be involved, such as doing things 
you couldn’t do before the diagnosis, you aren’t brave for doing them. Intuitively, we 
know your bravery is solely your emotional response: you endure by not feeling dread 
and anguish but feeling, in their stead, contentment with regards to your fate.  
      The emotions Aristotle wants us to feel in their own right, i.e., the correct emotions, 
are emotions felt for the sake of a life lived well. Aristotle says that feeling “certain 
emotions…for the right end…is proper to virtue (NE 2.6.1106b.11). For Aristotle, the 
right end, of course, is a life lived well. But, surely, many of our emotions aren’t means 
to an end. I don’t, for example, love my best friend in order to get something out of 
him; I love him because I am attached to him. And Aristotle recognizes this facet of our 
emotions. He writes, “good people…[are] friends to each other because of the other 
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person himself” (NE 8.4.1157a.19). According to this passage, the right love (i.e., love 
felt for a life lived will) is when a lover loves for love’s sake and not for an end apart 
from the beloved, which implies that Aristotle doesn’t think emotions have 
instrumental value.   
     Instead, feeling emotions for the sake of a life lived well means feeling emotions that 
are constitutive parts of this kind of life.  Aristotle claims, “the excellent person labors for 
his friends…and will die for them” and that the “one who dies for others…choose[s] 
something great and fine for himself [i.e., a life lived well]” (NE 9.8.1169a.20-23). Since 
you can’t live well if you are dead4, these passages can’t be suggesting that someone’s 
dying for another person purchases a life being lived well. Rather, the passages must be 
suggesting that a person lives well if he is willing to die for his friends. And since 
intuitively it seems absurd to imagine that someone cares enough about someone to die 
for her while also seeing her as a mere means, the agent’s willingness to die must be a 
part of his living well, further explaining why Aristotle thinks proper love is for the sake 
of the beloved: the lover’s passionate love for the beloved’s own sake--a love that makes 
him willing to die for that person if need be—helps make up his living well. So, as 
Aristotle’s account of love just demonstrated, emotions have intrinsic value; he thinks 
we should feel emotions that are part and parcel of living well.  
      Specifically, which emotions does Aristotle have in mind? To answer this question, 
we first need a precise understanding of what he thinks emotions are and what he thinks 
they do. This understanding will help us determine why Aristotle thinks certain emotions 
(like love) constitute our living well and, in turn, which emotions fulfill that purpose.   
 
 
                                                            II 
 
      On Aristotle’s account, emotions have at least two central features5. Firstly, he 
thinks emotions have intentionality, that is, they aim at specific object(s). We know this 
because he says emotions are directed towards “the right things, [and] towards the right 
people” (NE 2.6.1106b.23). We will discuss what he means by the “right things” later. 
Secondly, Aristotle thinks emotions are representational in that they cannot be 
                                                 
4 Even Aristotle says this in his discussion on the value of the good life for the dead (NE 1.10-11). 
5 Aristotle certainly thinks emotions have a third central feature: they involve sensations. In other 
words, each emotion “implies pleasure and pain” (NE 2.1105b20). However, this aspect of emotions 
isn’t relevant to my argument; refer to Jamie Dow’s Aristotle’s Theory of the Emotions: Emotions as 
Pleasures and Pains for an in depth discussion on this affective side of emotions.  
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separated from judgments about what their objects are like6. For example, I am envious 
of my friend getting a high-paying job. My envy involves painfully judging his job to be 
something he shouldn’t have since I don’t have it. Without this judgment, there would 
be no envy. Aristotle, in line with my example, thinks envy is “a certain kind of distress 
at apparent success on the part of one’s peers…not that someone [the envier] may get 
anything for himself but because of those who have it” (Rhetoric, 10.1387b.1). Here, 
Aristotle defines envy in terms of the judgment that envy’s object—a peer’s success—
is something that the peer shouldn’t have. But what precisely is the relationship between 
emotions and judgments? 
      Emotions are evaluative judgments. Aristotle claims, “one loves not what is good 
for him, but what appears good for him…since [what appears good for him] will be 
what appears loveable” (NE 8.2.1155b). Straightforwardly, the claim here is that we 
don’t love a thing on the basis of it having loveable qualities in-itself. Rather, we love a 
thing by judging it to have loveable qualities. Aristotle also says, “friends whose love accords 
with the worth of their friends are enduring friends” (NE 8.8.1159b2). This statement 
suggests that our love corresponds to the value of an object of love. But, since love 
doesn’t recognize things to have loveable qualities in-themselves, the nature of this 
correspondence can’t be that our love recognizes the value something has independent 
of our loving it. So the nature of this correspondence must be that love itself is the 
judgment that its object is valuable, which is why Aristotle says we love something by 
judging it to be loveable.  This understanding of love is proof for Martha Nussbaum’s 
claim that “beliefs [for Aristotle] must be regarded as constituent parts of what the 
emotion is” and that these beliefs are “ascription[s] of significant worth to items in the 
world” (Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion, 309; 312). 
      Aristotle understands our emotions to be thick value judgments: they ascribe 
meanings to the objects at which they aim in terms of what the objects mean to us. To 
put it differently, we find certain things meaningful, by which I mean mattering to us in 
any way, and various emotions ascribe those meanings. Returning to love, Aristotle 
thinks that love determines that the object of love has features that, on account of 
which, we consider the object a vital part of our life.  I love and consider my mother 
the most important person in my life because she, among an inexhaustible list of other 
features, selflessly cares for me: “this sort of friendship…embraces in itself all the features 
                                                 
6 In Aristotle and the Cognitive Component of Emotions (166-77), Giles Pearson has a comprehensive 
summary of the scholarly debate on what exactly Aristotle’s conception of emotions is. In it, he 
indicates that the different sides to the debate agree that Aristotle ascribes these two features to 
emotions. Nussbaum also has an account of these two features in Emotions and Rational Persuasion.   
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that friends must have” (NE 8.3.1156b.7); “In loving their friend they love what is good 
for themselves” (NE 8.5.1157b.5). Besides love, there is, as you will see below, textual 
evidence that Aristotle finds other emotions to be judgments that make their objects 
meaningful in some way. 
Consider this list. Envy, which was glossed earlier, is the judgment that 
something (my friend getting a job) shouldn’t exist because I didn’t get it. Anger, being 
a “desire...for conspicuous retaliation for a conspicuous slight” (Rhetoric, 2.1337b), is the 
judgment that something (cheating lover) has wronged me and needs to pay for it.  Fear 
is the judgment that something (this rabid dog) is threatening my well-being: “Fear… 
[is an] agitation derived from the imagination of a future destructive or painful evil” 
[Rhetoric 2.5.1382a.1].  Indignation, since it is “pain at unmerited good fortune” 
(Rhetoric, 2.1386b), judges some thing’s success (Ayn Rand’s fame) to be unbearable 
insofar as it is unwarranted. Though this is a limited list of emotions, these examples 
highlight a pattern in the way Aristotle defines emotions; clearly, he has a cognitivist 
understanding of emotions.
      Aristotle thinks the role of emotions is to ascribe different meanings to things. So 
the reason why emotions constitute a life lived well must be connected to this role. In 
order to fully explain that connection, we now need an account of the relationship 
between ascribing meaning to things and someone’s living well.                    
                                                              
 
III
 
       Aristotle thinks that part of an agent’s living well is that he finds certain things 
meaningful. Aristotle writes, “happiness [a life lived well] …needs external goods to be 
added” (NE 1.1099a). An external good is some external thing (i.e., person and thing 
outside the agent, in the world, which the agent can’t fully control) that is a good: 
“having friends [for example] seems to be the greatest external good” (NE 10.1169b). 
And Aristotle is suggesting that we need external goods because they are constitutive 
parts of a life lived well7. But to pursue and procure such goods, we have to first 
consider some external thing and, by implication, anything related to it meaningful in 
someway. For example, I consider my parents being pleased a good because I consider 
their pleasure valuable. Due to this judgment, I find doing whatever I can to please 
                                                 
7 For a very comprehensive discussion on external goods in Aristotle’s conception of a life lived 
well, see Nussbaum’s Fragility of Goodness (xv-xvii; 6-8; 318-19; 343-54).  
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them necessary and their dying utterly horrible insofar as it forever cuts away chances 
of their being pleased. So if procuring external goods helps constitute a life being well-
lived, determining certain things in the world (and everything connected to them) 
meaningful in some way is also part and parcel of  such a life. 
      The reason why giving meaning to certain things in the world is a component of 
living well comes down to Aristotle’s view of human nature. Aristotle thinks we have 
certain innate human capabilities and that we, by actualizing them, function in the way 
we are meant to function. According to Aristotle, this optimal functioning constitutes 
a life being lived well: “the good…for whatever has a function [i.e., innate capabilities] 
…depends on its function” (NE 1.7.1097b). One such innate human capability is the 
need to engage with things in the world. This is why Aristotle thinks that someone living 
well can’t live “an isolated life” (NE 1.1097b.8-10), i.e., a life without external goods, 
and that “a human being…by nature [tends] to live together with others” (NE 
10.9.1169b). So an agent’s finding people and other external things meaningful in 
someway is a part of his living well, for he, by finding them meaningful, actualizes the 
innate capability of engaging with external things. 
        We now know why the right emotions are constitutive parts of a life lived well; 
they ascribe meanings that help constitute such a life. We saw that emotions for 
Aristotle are value judgments that aim at specific things. Turning back to this 
conception, it is clear that our emotions, as demonstrated by the emotions we covered 
earlier, ascribe meanings to people and things in the world; love, for example, 
determines another person or object in the world to be indispensable. Even self-
directed emotions, such as self- pity, are in light of the agent ascribing meanings to 
certain external things8: a 19 year old with no friends pities himself insofar as he doesn’t 
have certain external things—important relationships with other people--that he esteems. 
So Aristotle, by writing that the right emotions aim at “the right things…[and] people” 
(NE 2.6.1106b.23), is suggesting that the right emotions are the ones that ascribe the 
kind of meanings someone gives to certain external things as part of his life being lived 
well. 
         The question of which emotions constitute a life being well-lived, then, becomes 
the question of which meanings and external things constitute such a life. And Aristotle 
doesn’t specify what those things and meanings are. To be sure, he thinks there are 
                                                 
8 Robert Solomon makes this point when he says: “In fact, many, if not all, of our emotions essentially 
include other people, not only as their objects but as a contributing source of their value and as 
shared subjects in what is called intersubjectivity” (The Passions, 20).  
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certain things and meanings that constitute such a life, which is why he specifically says 
we need to love our friends: insofar as we are “naturally political animals” (NE 1.1097b), 
he thinks we all need such intimate social relationships.  But beyond a few 
specifications, Aristotle doesn’t get into which external things we should find 
meaningful and the ways in which we should find them meaningful. Instead, he asserts, 
”the excellent person judges each sort of thing correctly…[he is] a sort of standard and 
measure ” (NE 3.113a). Explaining how a person living well is a standard and measure, 
Heda Segvic says, “there is an element of irreducible subjectivity in Aristotle’s account 
…a human being does not do well in life unless he lives in accordance with his own 
conception of what doing well in life consists in” (Deliberation and Choice in Aristotle, 180-
81). Thus determining which external things and judgments about them—by extension 
which emotions--constitute a life lived well is a matter of preference; we each pick what 
uniquely composes our living well9.  
                                                          
IV 
 
      The question of how we can choose to feel the right emotions is difficult to answer. 
For emotions seem to strike us outside of our control. When a friend dies, it feels like 
a nebula of despair besieges you. Describing his love, Tolstoy’s Levin proclaims, “It is 
not my feeling but some external power that has seized me” (Anna Karenina, 36). Indeed, 
emotions seem like afflictions that act on us, without our having any decision over 
which emotions to feel and when to feel them10. And Aristotle is sympathetic to this 
experience of emotions, which is why he (as mentioned in the introduction) claims that 
we can’t control which emotions we feel. 
      However, we are capable of altering the emotions that afflict us. Like all other 
beliefs, the judgments that compose our emotions are alterable. With the exception of 
                                                 
9 These preferences aren’t arbitrary or in a vacuum. Aristotle says, “actions in life…are the subject 
and premises of our arguments” (NE 1.1095a), which means our “disorganized bundle of likes and 
dislikes based on habit and experience…will be rich enough to provide an adequate basis for 
worthwhile ethical reflection” (Aristotle’s Ethics, SEP). In other words, Aristotle thinks an agent’s 
“desires…dispositions of evaluation…personal loyalties, and various projects…[and] commitments” 
(Internal and External Reasons, 105) inform his conception of his good life. For example, someone 
with a family may have the desire to be a caring father and husband. He would, as a result, consider 
pleasing his family—perhaps by occasional road trips and gift giving—necessary to his living well.  
10  In fact, some commentators argue that Aristotle’s conception of emotions is a view in which 
emotions are akin to afflictions: they impress on us outside of our control, representing the object at 
which they aim in a particular way. See Gisela Striker’s Emotions In Context (296-99) for a defense of 
this view and Jaime Dow’s concise summary of this view in Emotions and Appearances in Aristotle (145).  
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emotions that don’t respond to our rational judgments (like phobias and other irrational 
anxieties)11, we can modify our emotions by altering the judgments that constitute them. 
I can, for example, destroy my envy at my friend’s job by ceasing to see his job as 
something he didn’t deserve. Furthermore, I can turn this envy into contentment—an 
emotion that judges its object to be satisfactory12--by determining that he, since he is 
more skilled than me, deserves the job while I really don’t. So, through revising the 
judgments that compose our emotions, we can either stop feeling certain emotions or 
can transform our emotions into other emotions.   
      This ability to transform our emotions into other emotions explains how we can 
choose to feel the right emotions. To choose an emotion, the agent has to first unveil 
what meanings particular emotions of his ascribe. And if the agent thinks for whatever 
reason that these meanings don’t constitute his living well, he can swap them with 
meanings that form other emotions and are fitting for such a life: “a prudent 
person…deliberate[s] finely…about what sort of things promote living well” (NE 
6.1140a). Thus, even though we can’t control when emotions strike us, we can feel the 
right emotions by transforming the ones that strike us.  
       To see an example of this process, let us visit Iris Murdoch’s famous M—D 
scenario. In it, M “feels hostility [i.e., contempt] to her daughter-in-law” (Sovereignty of 
Good, 16). But M was also animated by a “sense of justice” (Sovereignty of Good, 17), which 
we, by editing the scenario with Aristotelian terms, can pretend means wanting to live 
well. And M, for whatever reason, thought her contempt was a roadblock to her living 
well. So she ventured to change that emotion to one fitting for her good life, aiming to 
love D by trying “to see her…lovingly” (Sovereignty of Good, 23).  Changing the judgments 
that formed her contempt, M no longer judged D as “vulgar but refreshingly simple, 
not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but 
delightfully youthful” (Sovereignty of Good, 17). In short, M chose to transform her hostile 
judgments into judgments associated with affection, thereby transforming her contempt 
into another emotion: love.    
  
                                                 
11 See Dow’s Emotions and Appearances in Aristotle  (144-47) and Feeling Fantastic Again (246-48) discuss 
Aristotle’s take on recalcitrant emotions.  
12 See Solomon on contentment (The Passions, 235-36).  
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ABSTRACT 
In an effort to assert a realist position of teleology, the study of ends and purposes 
in things, I argue that even popular naturalistic or non-supernatural metaphysical 
frameworks have fundamentally teleological commitments. After all, the Neo-
Aristotelians and the Neo-Kantians insisted that this realist position was integral to any 
full understanding of the observable universe. In modern science, teleological language 
is used frequently, and rather than assuming that this is an oversimplification of the 
facts, it seems more probable that our purpose-oriented language suggests that there 
exist really purpose-oriented things. The plausibility of real purposes in things, what 
these purposes might be like, and how they can shape human action are examined in a 
case study of medical ethics: diagnosing identity disorders.  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Teleological language is used all the time: “I called you today to see how you are 
doing” or “Your food is for eating, not for playing!” What is implied here is that 
particulars (a phone call or food) can intrinsically have purpose (for showing care or for 
consumption). However, for many people this kind of language is uncomfortable. Is 
there real, intrinsic purpose in real things, or is a thing’s “purpose” extrinsically imposed 
by conscious agents? To put it another way, when someone says, “The nucleus is the 
control center of the cell,” there is a significant underlying assumption being made: that 
the nucleus just by virtue of being a nucleus has a purpose, namely to control the 
happenings within the cell. Is this purpose or telos a real metaphysical reality or is it just 
creative, descriptive language used by biologists? If telos is real, do all individuals have a 
real, intrinsic telos? If not, why do we use this type of language in both everyday and 
technical language? While a realist position was ubiquitous during the ancient and 
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medieval periods, the ubiquity of materialism has swayed the general consensus towards 
an anti-realist position. This curious transition from teleology as a universal necessity to 
a position that is almost laughable to hold is quite dramatic, and it is the point of this 
paper to argue that this transition is unjustified. 
Proving the validity of realist or Neo-Aristotelian teleology would be well beyond 
an undergraduate’s capability as well as beyond the scope of this small paper. Instead, I 
will focus on two common misconceptions that have altered the world’s perception of 
teleology and show that the teleological framework offers an insightful interpretive lens 
for normative ethics. The first misconception is that teleology necessarily requires some 
supernatural purpose-giver or that teleology necessarily presupposes creationism. The 
logical jump is perhaps exacerbated by the high profile given to science-religion debates, 
the politics of creationism in the classroom, and intelligent design in the media. While 
creationism does strongly imply teleology, I will argue that the reverse is not necessarily 
the case, and that non-supernatural metaphysics must suppose inherent telos in things 
as well. The second misconception is that teleologically-oriented ethics is necessarily 
consequentialist. Consequentialism is a normative ethical theory that determines 
between courses of action by analyzing their consequences. To coin a phrase, the ends 
justify the means. The temptation then is to assume that teleological ethics, because of 
teleology’s focus on final ends, would be consequentialist in nature. In contrast, it seems 
to me that a teleological perspective is wholly separate, and can even compensate for 
many shortcomings in consequentialist ethics.  
 
II THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON TELEOLOGY 
Famously, Aristotle writes in his Physics that to understand anything, one must 
understand its causes including formal, material, efficient, and final causes. Though the 
word “teleology” would not be coined until more than a millennium later, Aristotle’s 
final cause is teleological: an acorn’s final cause is to be an oak tree, a hammer’s is to 
drive nails, and an airborne rock’s is to fall to earth. Any natural being in Aristotle’s 
system had to be understood according to his four causes, and necessarily by extension, 
a final cause. 
Regardless of Aristotle’s considerations about the divine, the idea of telos was 
never explicitly linked to a telos-giver. It was a fundamental fact of the natural order. To 
quote his Physics: 
“The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that. It 
is plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose.” 
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Admittedly, without context, this quote is hardly convincing. Preceding this 
quote is an entire passage dedicated to examples of natural occurrences that have ends: 
incisors are always in the front of the mouth, roots always grow towards the soil, and 
nests are built for the use of the family. Aristotle argues from this that coincidence 
cannot be an accurate description of natural processes. After all, one would be very 
surprised if their molars were growing in the front of the mouth, if roots sprang up 
from a tree into the air, or nests were built and unused. If these cannot be characterized 
by coincidence, they must be purposeful. In other words, such things have inherent 
telos. There are no mentions of a purpose-giver to inspire front-of-mouthness in incisors 
or references to intention and cognition on the part of the incisors themselves. Their 
purpose is not some secondary trait to their existence. Rather, their purpose and 
function informs their existence. 
Even for the religious medieval, teleology was a natural assumption about the 
state of the world, and did not rely on supernatural causes: 
“But a natural thing, through the form by which it is perfected in its 
species, has an inclination to its proper operations and to its proper end, 
which it achieves by operations, ‘for as everything is so does it operate,’ 
and it tends to what is fitting for itself. Hence, also, from an intelligible 
form there must follow in one who understands an inclination to his 
proper operations and his proper end.”  
In this excerpt from his Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas differentiates between 
intellect-driven purpose and natural purpose. Certainly, there is a kind of “purpose” or 
“end” that is intentional, but this is wholly separate and distinct from the natural 
purpose of individuals to pursue their perfect ends. An “inclination” he calls it. 
Teleology is this inherent end in all things. Even in his teleological argument for the 
existence of God, the argument is not “If God, then teleology,” but rather “if teleology, 
then God”: 
“The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things 
which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from 
their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. 
Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now 
whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some 
being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. 
Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their 
end; and this being we call God.” 
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Purpose and telos in individuals is an assumption of the first premise. A general 
commitment to realist teleology is anticipated at the outset, upon which the argument 
stands. Regardless of whether or not the argument is convincing, it seems to me that 
for Aquinas, teleology was an apparent metaphysical truth not just for the Christian, 
but for the non-Christian as well. 
Contemporary allergies to espousing a teleological metaphysics was probably 
inspired by philosophers of science like Descartes, Galileo, Bacon, and Newton. The 
argument goes that if the physical universe can be described in terms of mathematics 
and physical laws, then no divine hand was needed to keep the clockwork moving, and 
no intrinsic “purpose” was needed to explain the motion of things. Teleological 
language was too metaphysical in the pejorative sense, too non-physical. Physical things 
were inert quantities of matter, and any talk of purpose that seemed to imply 
intentionality fit more into the “mental” category. Descartes’s mind-body dualism 
helped to drive home this distinction. Causality happened not because objects tend 
towards certain ends, but merely because matter operates according to some pattern or 
repetition of occurrences. Thereby teleology would join the ranks of astrology and 
alchemy as a pseudoscience. At best, teleology was just a helpful heuristic for explaining 
things macroscopically and at worst, a theory that failed to get at the real workings of 
things. 
Despite these accusations, the fact that teleological language is still widely used, 
even in academic circles, seems to me to be a strong indicator that teleology might have 
more meat to it than many give it credit for. Take for example a stomach. A stomach is 
the organ that breaks down food, fulfilling a specific role within the digestive tract. It is 
not enough to say that a stomach is some organ containing acid (there are plenty of 
those), or merely some part of the gastrointestinal system (there are plenty of those as 
well). It seems that the definition of a stomach, the organ that breaks down food for 
digestion, is inextricably tied to its function. Even deeper biological entities at the 
subcellular level, the names of many enzymes, proteins, and organelles, betray that they 
are understood by their function: receptors, inhibitors, promoters, transcriptase, etc. 
The body cannot be fully understood apart from how its parts work together. The very 
idea of an organism necessarily includes teleological explanations. 
The 20th century Neo-Kantians built off of this idea. Heinrich Rickert 
acknowledged that biology as a whole is the study of teleological unities, or systems of 
interrelated functions. Organisms, body systems, cell cycles, intermolecular processes - 
these are all concepts that, in order to fully understand them, require reference to 
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multiple processes working together. Again, this is teleological. Now it is true that many 
cite evolution as a process which does away with teleology. There is no intrinsic 
purpose, merely happenstance mutations that end up being beneficial for those that 
survive. In this view, evolution is fundamental, and teleology is derived. Georg Toepfer 
argues for the opposite: one needs teleology to explain the evolution. Evolution is a 
population’s change for better fitness and reproduction. But the very idea that some 
population changes over time is a little baffling philosophically. If we want to say 
organism population X changes or evolves, how can we still call it organism population 
X? Would it not be organism population Y now? This is a variation on the classic ship 
of Theseus problem. Replace one plank on a ship, and it seems valid to call it the same 
ship. Replace every plank and nail, get new sails, and a new flag, and now can it be still 
called the same ship? For Georg Toepfer, teleology and function is that which persists 
through the change: 
“…[D]espite the changes in its matter and form, an organism may remain 
the same individual. What defines the starting and end point of its 
existence is not the coherence of a certain amount of matter or the 
maintenance of a certain form but the cyclical causal structure of the 
system, i.e. the duration of the interaction of its components and 
activities.” 
Again, I must stress that I have not in any way proved that metaphysical teleology 
is valid. Rather, I have argued from the testimony of philosophers throughout history 
that teleology is an important part in our understanding of the world around us. 
Therefore, the burden of proof seems to me to be on the teleological “deniers” to 
account for why teleology is so important for understanding and talking about the world 
around us, and yet is somehow neither fundamental nor real. 
 
III DIFFERENTIATING CONSEQUENTIALIST AND TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS 
At this point in the essay, I will turn to addressing the second misconception. 
Teleological considerations, as they apply to normative ethics, oftentimes are 
misinterpreted as consequentialist in nature. A generalized overview of the argument 
might appear something like this: 
1.     Consequentialist ethics states that to determine best course of action, one 
must evaluate the action’s end result 
2.     An action is a kind of particular of the nature p -> q, p being the cause, and 
q being the end 
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3.     In consequentialist ethics, q is the subject of interest 
4.     Teleology is the study of ends, and q’s are ends 
5.     Therefore, teleological ethics is consequentialist 
It seems to me that the problem with this reasoning lies in Statement 4. Statement 4 
assumes that focusing on the end of an action is at least similar to focusing on its final 
end. Recall first that St. Aquinas differentiated between intended ends and natural ends. 
I think it would be prudent to apply this distinction here, if we are to take teleological 
distinctions seriously. 
The consequentialist cares for neither intended nor natural ends; his focus is on 
the actual (or potentially actual) result of the action being taken. Murder is wrong 
because a death occurs. She should get a traffic ticket because she was speeding. The 
consequences of murder are wrong, and therefore murder is wrong. Breaking the law 
has bad societal consequences, and therefore it is wrong. However, in a teleological 
framework, the difference between an intended end and the natural end as a separate 
issue is vitally important. Murder is wrong not only because it leads to death, but also 
because of a person’s role in society. Like an organism, society has parts that function 
together, and the person about to commit murder is a part of that society. Notice that 
the considerations are different: for the consequentialist, it is merely what happens next 
that is of utmost importance, whereas for the teleological perspective, it is important to 
consider how the person fulfills or does not fulfill their telos. To put it another way, in 
a utilitarian view, there is one right course of action: that which results in the most 
aggregate amount of happiness. In a teleological perspective, there are many possible 
courses of actions that fulfill one’s natural telos, and one must be wary of those that do 
not. 
To illustrate these objections, I employ the classic trolley problem. Suppose a 
train is speeding towards a junction of which only you have control. Should it be 
allowed to continue on its course, the train will run over four civilians who have been 
chained to the track. Should you pull a certain lever, the train will commence onto a 
second track on which is tied only one civilian. Do you pull the lever and save the four, 
or do nothing and save the one? Now, another iteration of the trolley problem is the 
surgeon’s problem. Suppose you are the only surgeon in town, and there are four 
patients that are missing four different organs. All will die soon without the necessary 
transplants. A stranger walks into town with a set of fully functional organs. Do you kill 
the one and harvest the organs in order to save the four patients? Or do you let the four 
patients die? 
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My point here is not to propose an answer to these hypothetical situations, but 
to illustrate a point. For the consequentialist, the answer should be the same in all 
iterations of the problem because the results end up being essentially the same: either 
one person dies, or four people die. Curiously, though many people are often willing to 
pull the lever to change the train’s course thereby saving the four on the tracks, many 
are hesitant to kill the one and harvest the organs to save the four on the operating 
table. This fits a teleological framework very well. The addition of telos points will add 
complexity to the situation. A doctor harvesting organs for patients? Surely this is 
perverse because a doctor is not meant to take advantage of a person! Their purpose is 
the preservation of their patients! Sometimes the trolley problem is rephrased by adding 
that the one person about to be run over is your family member, and the other four are 
wanted criminals. The telos to care for family brings tension to this situation, and perhaps 
the oftentimes perceived telos of society’s role to punish criminals. 
It is my suspicion that the consequentialist must abstract himself from the 
situation. In abstracting himself, he trivializes the complexity of the problem. And in 
trivializing the problem, he misdiagnoses a solution. A teleological approach would be 
qualitatively different. It is important to note that consequentialist ethics and 
teleological ethics are not wholly distinct from each other. In fact, the consequentialist 
can most definitely apply a teleological framework to their moral calculations. What is 
being noted here is that teleological ethics is different than merely consequentialist 
ethics, and that many ethical frameworks could benefit from an analysis of purpose in 
things. 
 
IV THE PROBLEM OF DIAGNOSING IDENTITY DISORDERS 
Let us examine the case of Amber “Jewel” Shuping. She claimed that she always 
felt like she was a blind person in a normal person’s body, and wanted so badly to be 
blind that she asked doctors to assist her. After her requests were rejected, she took 
matters into her own hands and blinded herself with a drain cleaner. She was 
subsequently diagnosed with a mental disorder called body integrity identity disorder 
(BIID), and acknowledged this diagnosis. Body integrity identity disorder is an umbrella 
term for any number of similar situations in which a patient has an otherwise normally 
functioning body, yet desires the amputation of or loss of function in any number of 
body faculties. What interests me are the differences between the popular responses to 
BIID and gender identity disorder (GID). It has become more commonplace that 
doctors who have patients with GID oblige their patients, assisting them with hormone 
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altering medications, providing surgery, and even changing the terminology from 
disorder to dysphoria. The same cannot be said generally for patients with BIID. 
Interestingly, a lot of the same justifications are used for both groups: a sense of “being 
born in the wrong body,” a desire for bodily alterations that often require drastic 
chemical or physical changes, and emotional scarring as a result of social anxiety and 
shame. 
Again, it seems to me to be the case that in this situation the consequentialist has 
no way of differentiating between the two cases. In both cases, the patient feels a lack 
of correspondence between who they feel they should be and how they actually are. In 
both cases, doctors and medical practitioners have the skills and expertise to alleviate 
the patient of this stress, and the patient desires this. If the consequentialist argues for 
a particular solution in one instance, they must also invariably offer the same solution 
in the other case, assuming the situations are similar. Now, it should be noted that I am 
not equating the two conditions, nor am I saying that they are the same kind of 
biochemical phenomenon. Rather, what I am suggesting is that the consequentialist 
cannot differentiate between the two cases; replace BIID or GID with any other 
similarly justified position and the question remains unchanged. 
This is problematic, as the consequentialist position seems to lead to the 
conclusion that doctors have a moral obligation to fulfill the desires of a patient. If a 
patient feels discomfort, dysphoria, or even suicidal thoughts, what is the difference 
consequentially? A utilitarian might offer that injury or harm depletes the general 
happiness, and that those conditions that ultimately harm or end the life of a patient 
would be ill advised. But what if injury would bring them happiness and non-injury 
would bring them pain? Take this hypothetical situation: a patient comes from a suicidal 
family. Not just their immediate family, but their aunts, uncles, cousins, and in-laws are 
all partial to the idea that life should be ended as soon as possible. Here is a case where 
death would increase happiness. Would it be right for the doctor to oblige the patient 
if the patient came in asking for assistance in suicide? Though this situation is quite 
farfetched, I think it shows something important: an increase in total happiness cannot 
be the whole story. And so from the wide spectrum of “no harm to the patient” to 
“ending a patient’s life,” there does not seem to be a difference for the consequentialist. 
How then does teleology sort through the problem of diagnosing mental disorders? If 
it is not dependent upon the patient’s opinion or the opinions of the society around 
them, how can one understand these things? It should be first noted that the idea of 
“disorders” depends on a teleological framework. The idea of “normal” functions, 
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especially the normal functioning of the internal systems of an organism, is by definition 
teleological. “Disorder” would then imply a deviation from the normal, and therefore 
dependent upon a teleological framework. 
Let us return to our example of BIID. If a patient comes and wants their legs 
amputated, not because they have any specific defect, but because the patient feels like 
they should be amputated, what are we to make of that situation? A teleological 
framework would need to consider whether or not amputation would help that 
individual fulfill his or her telos. The primary hesitation of a doctor would be that 
amputation would be debilitating for a healthy person as it removes the power of 
locomotion. I think this correlates very well with the function of the legs: to amputate 
would certainly be to inhibit a person’s ability to fulfill their telos, which seems contrary 
to a doctor’s telos of promoting health in an individual. After all, doctors typically remedy 
abnormal functions: invading diseases, chemical imbalances, or broken limbs. 
Now, this is not necessarily a justification for never amputating an individual. 
There are certainly cases in which amputation is necessary. For example, the more a 
person is unable to function because of their condition, the more consideration a doctor 
might give to acquiescing the request. This is akin to the natural response of “it would 
be better to give her what she wants and help her re-enter a healthy relationship with 
society than to leave her wallowing in daily torment.” If she was so bent on the 
amputation such that she was harming or inhibiting herself in more dangerous ways, it 
would be wiser to go through with the amputation. This is I think the advantage the 
teleological framework has over one that is merely consequentialist. The teleological 
framework takes morally grey areas seriously, rather than oversimplifying them, and 
also has the tools to sort through such situations. 
 
V. LAYING OUT THE TELEOLOGICAL ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
What can be considered a telos? It seems so far that the intrinsic purposes I have 
brought up are arbitrarily decided. While certainly more philosophical rigor can and 
should be applied to such a question, for the sake of brevity I will consider one 
important aspect of any telos: context. There is virtually nothing distinctive about a son-
patient relationship, and that can be alternatively described as son-patient lacking any 
real telos points. The son-father relationship, however, is full of ethical obligations - 
obligations that seem to me to be derived from the telos of a father to his son, and a son 
to his father. The son must consider the advice of his father, respect him, and do what 
he says (to a certain extent!). Those “son” obligations apply in the father-son context, 
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the only context that gives “son” its meaning. “Son” has no meaning in a son-patient 
context. If the son and the patient were friends, perhaps moral obligations would then 
arise from their friend-friend relationship. Tied to that relationship is a wholly different 
set of moral obligations that arise from their telos as a friend to another friend. When 
deciding whether or not to treat a patient with identity disorder, it seems to me that the 
doctor has a specific telos that is relevant to the situation. In a doctor-patient 
relationship, surely there are many moral considerations there! 
Let us say that the telos of a doctor in the doctor-patient relationship is to promote 
the patient’s health. This has significant ramifications on issues like cosmetic plastic 
surgery, abortions, transgender operations, etc. Now, it might be tempting to say that 
promoting a patient’s health would necessarily exclude these kinds of situations from 
ever being helped by a doctor. When will plastic surgery for beauty purposes promote 
health? Teleology has room in these cases, I think. Ideas of “health” involve more than 
just physical functionality, but societal health, a healthy vision of oneself, and personal 
health. Perhaps this is not the proper situation for a doctor to act. Perhaps the telos of a 
psychiatrist or a therapist is more suited to the case. The consequentialist ignores these 
considerations; it does not matter the role of the doctor. If it generates the most 
happiness, it must be done. So why treat the patient? Why refrain from treating patient? 
The consequentialist can only resort to: which action will generate the most benefits, 
happiness, etc.? I think that the teleological position more properly gets at what the 
actual issue is and opens the door to a wider window of possible solutions. 
In the consequentialist framework, not only does a doctor need to consider 
factors that are irrelevant to the situation, but the doctor does not even need to be a 
doctor. Every person has to make the same moral judgments, regardless of who they 
are. It does not matter if it is a doctor treating a patient or an artist treating the patient. 
They must go through the exact same moral considerations, and they have the same 
moral obligation to do whatever action comes out to produce the most good. I think a 
fundamentally teleological understanding of the world therefore is necessary even for 
the consequentialist, if at a minimum, just to parse out what the relevant factors are for 
their ethical calculus.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I have attempted to affirm the viability of realist teleology by 
debunking two misconceptions: that teleology necessarily implies creationism and that 
teleological ethics is merely another form of consequentialism. It seems to me that the 
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ancients almost ubiquitously assumed a teleological framework because understanding 
nature required it. Organisms, evolution, and even basic physical concepts require 
reference to processes with ends. To deny a realist teleological framework would be to 
banish much of our understanding of ourselves and the world around us to the realm 
of the imaginary. Adding in a teleological framework can provide great clarity, as I 
believe many scientists and philosophers have been doing by using teleological 
language, not only in daily life, but also to describe the processes going on, from the 
basic physical laws to the rational minds within ourselves. Ethics, specifically normative 
ethics, can benefit greatly from a confident espousal of teleology, helping people 
delineate between very difficult choices.  
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